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Abstract: The primary purpose of the study is to investigate the impact of investment efficiency 
on cost of the equity of firm. This study further explores whether the relationship of investment 
efficiency and cost of equity is different for the shariah and non shariah compliance firms. Using 
sample of 235 non financial firms listed at Pakistan stock exchange (PSX) for the period of 
2005-2015, the results revealed that there is a negative significant influence of investment 
efficiency on the cost of equity. This signifies that investors required rate of return increases with 
the increase in the level of investment inefficiency. We also found out that the negative 
association of investment efficiency and cost of equity is weaker for the shariah compliance 
firms than for non shariah compliance firms. The results of our study also provided evidences 
that overinvestment is positively associated with the cost of equity. But we are unable to find 
significant impact of under investment on the cost of equity, this pointed that over investment is 
considered more serious problem for investors as compared to the underinvestment. The results 
furnished empirical support to our argument that shariah acts as a mechanism to lower 
bankruptcy and leverage cost hence reduce the cost of equity. The findings are helpful for 
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academicians, regulators, investors and Shariah board. Further research may be conducted in 
different economies in order to generalize the findings. 
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Reference: Reference to this article should be made as: Nasir, A., Haris, A., Qaisar, A. M., & 
Abdul, W. (2018). Impact of investment efficiency on cost of equity: an empirical study on 
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1. Introduction 
The current study aims to explore the relationship between the investment efficiency and cost of 
equity in shariah and non shariah compliance firms listed in Pakistan. The relationship between 
investment efficiency and cost of equity is the hot ranging debate and fundamental concerns for 
improving the corporate governance practices (McNichols & Stubben, 2008). Previous studies 
suggested that firms investment decisions derives a cost of equity of investors, if a firm is 
investing efficiently it may reduces the cost of equity (Pindado  & De La, 2009).  
However, past literature indicates that in many instances, firms deviate from optimal investment 
level due to various market imperfections (Agrawal & Knoeber, 1996). Theoretically, agency 
problems gives rise to the cost of equity as it leads the firms towards inefficient investment 
decisions due to which the investor demand high returns(Ohlson & Juettner, 2005).Investment 
efficiency is an important concept because firms with higher investment efficiency are associated 
with the lower agency problems which mean that by aligning the interest of management and 
shareholders of the firms reduces the risk of deviating from the expected level of 
investment(Omran, 2009).    
Substantial literature in the area of corporate finance indicates that the firms with higher 
corporate governance practices ensure the balance among the interest of shareholders and 
management (Ali, Chen & Radhakrishnan, 2007). As ownership is separated from control, firms 
with poor corporate governance mechanism face the issue of conflict of interests between the 
real owners of the firm and the management (Hope & Thomas, 2008). According to a study, 
investors now a day’s prefer to invest in firms with high corporate governance structure as they 
consider corporate governance an important financial indicator (Hope, Kang, Thomas & Yoo, 
2009).  Another related study points out that the difficulty in monitoring the firm’s corporate 
governance practices results in higher rate of return demanded by the investors as they have to 
spend their time and resources on monitoring the management behavior (Houqe, Ahmed & Zijl, 
2017).  Good corporate governance mechanisms not only help to increase the value of firms but 
also to develop high standards of transparency and accountability that assist the managers to 
make efficient investment decisions (Huang, Wang & Zhang, 2009). To get financing from 
external sources firms use corporate governance mechanism as a tool to minimize information 
asymmetry which help them in attracting funds from investors at low cost (Hearn, Piesse & 
Strange, 2011).  
Firms incorporate various governance mechanisms in order to protect the interest of shareholders 
from the opportunistic behavior of managers as the separation of ownership and control brings 
information asymmetry between shareholders and managers (Rad, Embong, Mohd & Jaffar, 
2016). Information asymmetry exist because it imposes a huge challenge for the firms to deliver 
all the necessary information to all the relevant parties, and it also affects the real managerial 
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investment decisions due to this the cost of equity increases for the firm (Radhakrishnan, 2014). 
A study found that dispersion in earning forecast increases the cost of equity for firms and this 
can be reduced by narrowing down the information asymmetry between management and 
shareholders (Healy & Palepu, 2001).  In a competitive business environment firms now a day’s 
disclose more and more information to its stakeholder in order to become more transparent and 
capture the interest of investors which helps the firms to raise funds from outside sources at low 
cost (Halaby, 2004). Hence the cost of equity capital may be reduced for a firm adopting higher 
corporate governance mechanism (He, Lepone & Leung, 2013).   
Another approach suggested, which may reduce the cost of equity capital, is financial reporting 
quality (Hail & Leuz, 2006). Financial reporting quality also helps the firms to mitigate the 
information asymmetry between management and shareholders and also it influences the real 
managerial decisions (Margaritis & Psillaki, 2010). According to a research study, financial 
reporting quality reduces agency risk and it increases firm investment efficiency. It also suggests 
that any corporate governance mechanism which reduces agency conflicts would ultimately 
reduces the risk of inefficient investment (Guedhami & Mishra, 2009). Investment efficiency is 
considered as a predicted level of investment based on sales growth opportunities. A deviation 
from the predicted level of investment is considered as inefficient investment whether it is 
positive or negative (Gary, Koh & Tong, 2009). Firms face the issue of over investment due to 
the availability of free cash flows and mangers prefer to invest in those projects which are 
remunerative from a management perspective but are not good for shareholders (Gormley & 
Matsa, 2014).  
On the other hand under investment reflects the scenario in which firms fail to capture the 
opportunity of investing in projects with positive npv and that lost opportunity availed by the 
competitor results in lower profits (Lombardo & Pagano, 2002). Losing business to competitors 
and lower profits indicated inefficient investment decisions which may raise questions on the 
existence of firm (Hubbard, 1998).   
The main objective of this study is to investigate whether investment efficiency has any effect on 
firm cost of equity or not. Our study also aims to identify that how managerial decisions affect 
the cost of equity for a shariah and non compliance firms. This relationship between firm 
efficiency and cost of equity can be identified with the help of addressing the following question. 
The initial questions that arise after the study of existing literature are that how managerial 
decisions affect the cost of equity for the firm.  The second question of this study is whether 
impact of investment efficiency on cost equity is same for the shariah compliance firms and for 
non shariah compliance because both these type of firms are operating under the different 
framework but in a same market environment. The final question is that whether over investment 
or under investment affect the cost of equity for the firm or not as both the situations are value 
destroying activities.   
Another objective of this study is to examine whether the relationship between investment 
efficiency and the cost of equity is same for the shariah and non shariah compliance firms. In 
Pakistan a large number of shariah compliance firms are operating under the shariah framework 
and yet not enough amount of work have been done on determining the cost of equity for the 
shariah compliance firms as compared to non shariah compliance firms (Jaffar, Nor, Selamat & 
Ismail, 2017). To operate under the framework of “shariah compliance” a firm must meet all the 
six key requirements advised by the shariah board i.e. the core business of the company should 
be Halal (Majeed, Zhang & Umar, 2018). Secondly, total debt to total asset ratio should be less 
than 37 percent, thirdly, the ratio of investments in non compliant securities to total assets should 
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be less than 33 percent, fourthly, the ratio of income from non compliant securities to total 
revenue should be less than percent (Richardson, 2006). Fifthly, the ratio of illiquid assets to 
total assets should be at least 25 percent and lastly, the market price per share should be greater 
than the net liquid assets per share (Lambert, Leuz & Verrecchia, 2007). 
This research study makes the following contributions. First, it sheds light on the importance of 
investment efficiency that could affect the cost of equity for the firm in the context of Pakistan 
where a lot of markets imperfections are exist (Ruangviset, Jiraporn & Kim, 2014). Secondly this 
study explores the impact of investment decision on cost of equity for the shariah compliance 
firms and compared those results with the non shariah compliance firms (Lamver, Leuz & 
Verrecchia, 2011). In Pakistan there is a scant of research work in context of investment 
efficiency and cost of equity of firms. Thus, the findings of this research study extend the 
literature and may provide a parameter to shareholders to guard their interest. Finally, it 
addresses the issue of over and under investment that how different managerial decisions affect 
the cost of equity (Sanjeev & Sengupta, 2003). 
 
2. Literature Review 
All Firms need to raise capital in order to carry out their operations and for the expansion of their 
businesses (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). To get finance for their projects firms adopt either debt 
financing or equity financing.  However, in return the firm has to bear the costs that are required 
by the investors and efficient allocation of capital helps firms to reduce the cost of equity (Gode 
& Mohanram, 2003). Past studies point out that in emerging markets like Pakistan corporate 
governance mechanism are still not mature enough and it contributes to higher agency problems 
which leads managers towards inefficient investment which gives rise to cost of equity (Gelb & 
Strawser, 2001). The implementation of corporate governance mechanisms could help firms to 
decrease the cost of their equity capital since such mechanism assist investors to forecast the 
result of an investment with greater accuracy (Fu, Kraft & Zhang, 2012). Through better 
corporate governance practices firms attract potential investor’s by a sending a positive signal in 
the market that the management is working in the best interest of shareholder’s (Francis, 
Khurana & Pereira, 2005) 
In developing countries like Pakistan where high level of concentrated ownership structure exist 
it gives boost to the conflict of interests among the stakeholders and effect the firm’s investment 
decisions (Francis, 2005).    
It was argued that higher financial reporting quality could improve investment efficiency in two 
ways (Teti, Dell, Etro & Resmini, 2016). Firstly as it eliminates the information asymmetry 
among the managers and shareholders and secondly it prevents the managers to pursue their 
personal interest (Easley & Hara, 2004). It was suggested that any improvement in the disclosure 
will help the firm to reduce the uncertainty about the firm’s future in the market and will enable 
them to portray a positive image of the firm which will be helpful for firm to reduce the cost of 
equity (Easton, 2004). According to a research study, higher financial reporting quality could 
improve shareholders ability to monitor managerial activities and this will lead managers to 
invest more efficiently thus it will directly affect the cost of equity capital for the firm (Faccio, 
2006).  
It was reported that firms with higher reporting quality mitigates the risk of deviating from their 
expected investment level and reduces adverse selection cost (Dhaliwal, Tsang & Yang, 2011).  
A study points out that firms involved in financial misreporting are more vulnerable to make 
inefficient investment decisions (Titman, Wei & Xie, 2004). As such firms are able to obtain 
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cheaper finance due to overstating in the financial results (Tran, 2014) and thus, managers 
exploit these cheaper funds for their own benefit rather than to serve in the best interest of 
shareholders (Cuttillas & Sanchez, 2014).  According to researches, firms who ensure high audit 
quality mitigates the risk of inefficient investment because the need for quality auditing arises as 
external auditors limits the possibility of managerial opportunistic behavior and therefore 
reduces information risk (Collins & Huang, 2011). It has been documented that as the managerial 
ownership increases in a firm it lowers the cost of equity for the firm as managerial ownership 
aligns shareholders and management interests (Collett & Hrasky, 2005). Based on this discussion 
the first hypothesis is as follows: 
 
H1: There is a significant negative relationship between investment efficiency and cost of 
equity.  
 
The researchers of this study further extended the analysis by examining the impact of 
investment efficiency on cost of equity for shariah compliance firms and for non shariah 
compliance firms in Pakistan. One of the basic requirements to be shariah compliance firm in 
Pakistan is to have low amount of debt (Valta, 2012). Previous studies also suggested that firms 
with low leverage ratio are able to generate funds at low cost from external sources as they have 
little bankruptcy risk (Jensen, 1986). It was argued that firm’s leverage ratio is a key factor in 
determining the cost of equity for them (Kouser, Saba & Anjum, 2016). It was noted that threat 
of liquidation reduces as the firm uses low leverage and it affects the cost of equity capital for the 
firm (Chiang & Ko, 2009).  In another related study, it was noted that the restriction to hold less 
cash for shariah compliance firm help firms to make efficient investment decisions as it restricts 
the firm to hold excess amount of cash that managers can invest for their own benefits 
(Claessens, Djankov & Lang, 2000). 
   
H2: The negative association between investment efficiency and cost of equity is weaker for 
shariah compliance firms than and for non shariah compliance firms. 
 
The substitution theorem states that projects associated with high risks are expected to give high 
returns that maximizes the wealth of shareholders, whereas in case of loss it passed on to 
bondholders (Cheng, Collins & Huang, 2006). According to past research, the conflict between 
shareholders and bondholders leads the firms towards the problem of under investment or over 
investment (Cheng, Dhaliwal & Zhang, 2013). Most of the time firms face the issue of 
underinvestment because of the conflict between the shareholders and bondholders as 
bondholders do not have enough information about the quality of the investment projects of the 
firms and they demand higher premium (Xuan & Zhong, 2013). Overinvestment or under 
investment both the situations affect the firms negatively as it indicates that the firm is making 
inefficient investment decisions which gives rise to the cost of equity. Firm investment decisions 
are considered efficient if they undertake all the projects with positive net present value, if the 
firm turns down the opportunity to invest in projects that have positive net present value such 
decisions indicate that the firm is investing lower than the optimal investment level and thus firm 
faces the problem of under investment (Beiner, Drobetz, Schmid & Zimmermann, 2006). A large 
body of literature documented that whenever a firm faces a problem of under investment it 
destroys the value of the firm as firm losses business to its competitors and is not able to generate 
profit which raises questions regarding the survival of the firm (Jo & Harjoto, 2011). It was 
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concluded that the firms with higher level of free cash flows usually face the issue of over 
investment.  In the study it was pointed out that difficulty in monitoring that mainly occurs due 
to the information asymmetry which creates the opportunity for managers to invest in such 
projects that are lucrative for themselves but it demolishes the interest of shareholders (Attig, 
Guedhami  Mishra, 2008).   
Evidence has been provided that availability of high level of free cash flows encourages 
managers to invest in those projects which are expected to give low returns and which would be 
neglected if the funds need to be raised externally. Managers invest internally available free cash 
flow for their own interest but it can destroy firm value and shareholder value (Bertrand && 
Mullainathan, 2003).  Prior literature suggested that the availability of funds through internal or 
external sources affects the investment decisions of firms (Ashbaugh, Collins, Kinney & Lafond, 
2009). 
Low information asymmetry between the management and the corporate owner’s restrict the 
managers from making under or over investment decisions (Kabir & Veld, 2013). The argument 
is that when more information is disclosed by a firm publically, it enhances the shareholders 
ability to monitor management investment decision and it also makes much easier for the firms 
to raise capital externally at low cost (The National Bureau of Economic Research [NBER], 
2012).  
 
H3: There is a significant positive relationship between over investment and cost of equity. 
H4: There is a significant positive relationship between under investment and cost of equity.  
 
3. Methodology 
In order to explore the relationship between investment efficiency and cost of equity the current 
study analyzed a sample of 235 non financial listed firms on Pakistan Stock Exchange (PSX) 
from 2005 to 2015. The financial data of these companies are obtained from different sources 
like: State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) annual balance financial statements analysis of companies 
(non-financial) listed at Pakistan Stock Exchange (PSX), official websites of respective 
companies and Pakistan Stock Exchange.  
The details of the sampled 235 firms from 14 distinct sectors are as fallow;  106 firms from 
Textile Sector, 27 firms from Sugar Industry, 11 firms belong to Food Industry, 12 firms 
included from Chemicals, Chemical Products and Pharmaceuticals Industry, 21 firms taken from 
Other Manufacturing Industry, 3 firms form Mineral Products Industry, 11 firms form Cement 
Industry, 13 firms from Motor Vehicles Industry, Trailers and Auto Parts Industry, 6 of them 
from Fuel & Energy Industry, 6 firms from Information, Communication & Transport Services 
Industry, 3 firms from Coke and Refined Petroleum Industry, 2 firms from Paper, Paperboard 
and Products Industry, 2 firms from Electrical Machinery and Apparatus Industry and 2 firms 
belongs to Other Services Industry.   
This study proposes following models to test our hypothesis. Models are as below: 
COEit = β0 + β1IEit + β2SHit + β3SHIEit + β4BMit + β5TAit + β6LEVit + β7TANGit + β8CFOit+ 
β9GROWTHit + β10ROAit + ɛit ---------------------(i) 
 
COEit = β0 + β1OVERit + β3BMit + β4TAit + β5LEVit + β6TANGit + β7CFOit + β8GROWTHit 
+β9ROAit + ɛit---------------------(ii) 
 
COEit = β0 + β1UNDERit + β3BMit + β4TAit + β5LEVit + β6TANGit + β7CFOit +β8GROWTHit 
+β9ROAit + ɛit---------------------(iii) 
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Where COE represents cost of equity calculated as proposed by (Biddle & Hilary, 2006). IEit 
represents investment efficiency calculated following Biddle et al.,(2009). OVERit is over 
investment and UNDERit is under investment. SHit is a dummy variable, which is 1 for Shariah 
Compliance firms and zero otherwise.  BMitis the book to market value of equity, TAit is the log 
of total assets, LEVit is the leverage ratio, TANGit is the ratio of fixed assets to total asset, 
CFOit represents cash flow from operations scaled by total assets, GROWTHit is the average 
sales growth of last three years and ROAit is return on assets. Description of each of the variable 
of the study is provided as under.  
Cost of equity 
Cost of equity is the dependent variable in this study and Price Earning Growth ratio (PEG) as a 
proxy to measure ex-ante cost of equity capital is used as followed by (Biddle, Hilary & Verdi, 
2009).  
Therefore, the cost of equity capital in analysis is measured as follows: 
RPEG = 
             
   
 
Where Rpegis the implied cost of equity, epst+2 is the earning per share two years ahead and 
epst+1 represents the earning per share one year ahead. While Pit is the year ending share price.  
We used realized epst+1 and epst+2 instead of forecasted earning per share as earning forecast 
data is not available for the whole period.  PEG ratio approach requires that epst+2> epst+1> 0. 
To fulfill this assumption of PEG ratio we lost some observations. One of the main criticisms on 
PEG ratio approach is that it requires continuous earning growth but if a firm having negative 
earning price ratio in term of cost of equity it is difficult to interpret the results for loss making 
firms. Contrary to this, it was argued that PEG ratio is the superior approach in calculating the 
cost of equity to others as it reflects the riskiness of the firm more appropriately (Botosan & 
Plumlee, 2005). This measure is chosen because it has less arduous data requirements and also 
price-earnings ratio (PE ratio) is a useful technique to estimate rate of return in the equity market 
(Botosan & Plumlee, 2002).  
Investment Efficiency 
A firm is considered to be investing efficiently if it accepts all the projects with positive Net 
Present Value (NPV). According to prior literature, investment efficiency is measured as 
deviations from expected level of investment which is measured as predicted investment level 
based on sales growth opportunities. Therefore, both over investment and under investment are 
considered as inefficient investment decisions (Bushman & Smith, 2001). We estimated a model 
for expected investment as a function of sales growth. The model is described as follow: 
 
Investmentit= β0 + βSalesGrowthit-1 + ɛit---------------------(iv) 
 
Where, Investmentit is the total investment in the firm i in year t and it is defined as the net 
increase in tangible and intangible assets scaled by the total assets and SalesGrowthit-1 is the 
rate of change in sales from year t-2 to t-1. The discrepancy between actual and expected 
investment will represent the level of inefficient investment. Therefore, the positive deviation 
from predicted level of investment based on sales growth considered as overinvestment whereas 
a negative deviation from the predicted level of investment as per sales growth considered as 
underinvestment.  Absolute value of residual (IE) from the above equation is used as measure of 
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investment inefficiency. This identifies that higher value of IE represents higher value of 
investment inefficiency. 
This study included several control variables substantially based on previous studies.  The 
control variables employed in this study are Size, Book-to-market value, Leverage, Tangibility, 
Sale growth, Return on assets and Cash flow from operating activities. We controlled size by 
taking the natural logarithm of total assets as it affects the agency cost for the firm. Larger firms 
are considered to have low cost of equity as they are more established and stable which reduces 
default risk (Byun, Choi, Hwang & Kim, 2013). Leverage was controlled following prior studies 
because according to them as the leverage increases the cost of equity would also increase for the 
firm because of the greater demand for monitoring and disclosures (Chalevas & Tzovas, 2010).  
This study controls for ROA as previous studies document a negative relationship between 
profitability and cost of equity (Chen, Young & Zhuang, 2012). Book-to-market (BM) ratio is 
considered as control variable in this study as there is a positive relationship between BM ratio 
and expected returns (Kitagawa & Gotoh, 2011).  Growth is also controlled as firms linked with 
high long term growth in earning due to the high investment opportunities expected to have a 
lower cost of equity. Cash flows from operation and tangibility both are also used as control 
variables in this study to control the riskiness of the firms. 
 
4. Results and Discussion 
Table 1 provides the descriptive statistics for all the variables. It includes mean, median, 
maximum, minimum and standard deviation. Mean of Investment Efficiency (IE) is -8E-18 while 
it has maximum value 2.230 and minimum value is -9E+00 during sample period. Standard 
deviation of Investment Efficiency (IE) is 0.265. Mean of Over Investment (Over) is 0.116 while 
its maximum value is 2.230 and minimum value is 4.61E-05 during sample period. Standard 
deviation of over investment (Over) is 0.175.  Mean of under investment (Under) is -7E-02 while 
its maximum value is -8E-06 and has minimum value of -9E+00 during sample period. Standard 
deviation of under Investment (Under) is 0.285807.  Mean of cost of equity (COE) is 0.683 while 
it has maximum value of 6.162 and minimum value is 0.015 and value of standard deviation is 
0.741.  Average of Book to Market Value of Equity (BM) is 0.221 while it has maximum value 
of 7.379 and minimum value is -6E+00 and value of standard deviation is 0.647. Mean of Cash 
Flow from Operations (CFO) is 52949.01 while it has maximum value of 9358. And minimum 
value is -9E+05 and its standard deviation is 331016.4.  Mean of Leverage (LEV) is 0.698524 
while it has the maximum value of 12.16313 and minimum value is 0.007 and value of standard 
deviation is 0.696.  Mean of Size (TA) is 14.544 while it has maximum value of 20.132 and 
minimum value is 8.301 and value of standard deviation is 1.625.  Mean of Tangibility (TANG) 
is 0.542 while it has maximum value of 0.999 and minimum value is 0.000 and value of standard 
deviation is 0.221. Mean of Growth (GROWTH) is 2.165 while it has maximum value of 
971.717 and minimum value is -1E+00 and value of standard deviation is 42.508. Mean of 
Return on Assets (ROA) is 4.913 while it has maximum value of 266.050 and minimum value is 
-9E+01 and value of standard deviation is 16.219. 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
Variables Mean  Median  Max  Min  Std. Dev. 
IE -8.00E-18 -2.00E-02  2.230695 -9.00E+00  0.265619 
OVER  0.116115  0.060675  2.230695  4.61E-05  0.175411 
UNDER -7.00E-02 -4.00E-02 -8.00E-06 -9.00E+00  0.285807 
COE  0.683045  0.440900  6.162792  0.015782  0.741413 
BM  0.221026  0.146337  7.379208 -6.00E+00  0.647972 
CFO  52949.01  5478.105  9358538. -9.00E+05  331016.4 
LEV  0.698524  0.630368  12.16313  0.007217  0.696410 
TA  14.54451  14.49560  20.13230  8.301522  1.625914 
TANG  0.542890  0.552933  0.999682  0.000000  0.221157 
GROWTH  2.165800  0.157312  971.7170 -1.00E+00  42.50876 
ROA  4.913640  3.020000  266.0500 -9.00E+01  16.21966 
Where IE is the Investment Efficiency, COE is the ex ante cost of equity calculated following Easton 
(2004), BM is book to market value of equity, CFO is cash flow from operations divided by total assets, 
LEV is leverage ratio, TA is the log of total assets, TANG is ratio of fixed assets to total assets, ROA is 
return on assets and GROWTH is average sales growth. 
 
Table 2 reports the correlation among the variables. The value of cost of equity significantly 
positively correlated with the measure of inefficiency and its value is 0.1407. The value of 
correlation among Book to Market Value of Equity and measure of inefficiency is 0.0417. Cash 
flow from Operation is negatively correlated with measure of inefficiency having a value of -
0.022. Leverage also has a positive correlation with measure of inefficiency and its value is 
0.074. Size, Tangibility, Return on Assets and Growth all has a positive correlation with measure 
of inefficiency and their values are 0.0562, 0.1493, 0.0075 and 0.0996 respectively.        
 
Table 2: Correlation Matrix 
  IE COE BM CFO LEV TA TANG ROA GROWTH 
IE 1 
        COE 0.1407 1 
       BM 0.0417 0.1963 1 
      CFO -0.022 -0.09 -0.041 1 
     LEV 0.0743 0.2627 -0.269 -0.112 1 
    TA 0.0562 -0.115 0.0254 0.2836 -0.188 1 
   TANG 0.1493 0.1875 0.2324 -0.012 0.1414 0.111 1 
  ROA 0.0075 -0.291 0.0133 0.2255 -0.372 0.179 -0.27 1 
 GROWTH 0.0996 0.0051 -0.013 -0.012 0.0349 0.021 -0.002 -0.13 1 
Where IE is the Investment Efficiency, COE is the ex ante cost of equity calculated following Easton (2004), 
BM is book to market value of equity, CFO is cash flow from operations divided by total assets, LEV is 
leverage ratio, TA is the log of total assets, TANG is ratio of fixed assets to total assets, ROA is return on 
assets and GROWTH is average sales growth. 
Table 3 reports the results of impact of investment efficiency, over investment, under investment 
along with other control variables on cost of equity. In order to overcome the issue of 
endogeneity among the selected variables the study employed the Generalized Method of 
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Moments (GMM) for the estimation of the selected unbalance panel of 235 firms from non-
financial sector. The results of the model 1 in the first column study shows that there is negative 
significant impact of investment efficiency on cost of equity. This implies that Cost of equity 
increases as the firm makes inefficient investment decisions as coefficient of ABIE is .3793 with 
the P-value of 0.005. The result from regression shows negative association between investment 
efficiency and cost of equity. The findings support hypothesis H1. The results of this study are 
also consistent with prior research that firms with high corporate governance practices eliminates 
agency conflicts which results in lower cost of equity (Chen, Hope, Li & Wang, 2011).  
The Shariah Compliance firms are negatively associated with cost of equity as its coefficient 
value is -0.148002 with P-value of .0777. The results suggest that investors’ required rate of 
return on equity change for shariah and non shariah compliance firms. This implies that cost of 
equity of shariah firm is lower to the non shariah firms. This is consistent with our argument that 
shariah compliance firms have low default risk due to the low leverage so that is why they have 
low cost of equity as compared to non shariah compliance firms. The interaction term (SHIE) 
shows the impact for shariah compliance firms along with inefficient investment on cost of 
equity. The results revealed that interactive term (SHIE) coefficient value is -0.951 and P value 
is .0083, as the interactive (SHIE) term coefficient is negative and statistically significant this 
supports second hypothesis H2. The negative relationship between investment efficiency and 
cost of equity is weaker for Shariah Compliance firms than for Non Shariah Compliance firms.    
The results of the model 2 in table 3 also indicate that there is a positive and significant 
relationship exists between over investment and cost of equity as the coefficient of over 
investment (OVER) is 0.9011 with P- value of 0.0000. These results are in favor of our argument 
that over investment has a positive impact on cost of equity and thus our (H3) is also accepted on 
the basis of these results.  Our results are in line with the previous studies that concluded that the 
availability of free cash flows encourage managers to invest in such projects who offer less 
return because managers are more concerned about their own interests and therefore neglects the 
interests of shareholders (Chen, Chen, Lobo &Wang, 2011). 
The results of the model 3 indicate that the coefficient of under investment (UNDER) is -0.123 
and a P-Value of 0.8947 which suggests that there is negative and insignificant relation with the 
cost of equity.   Hence, the results for under investment also support the argument that when the 
firms invest lower than the predicted optimal level of investment it destroys the value of firm and 
in result it gives rise to the cost of equity for the firm.  These results are in line with the prior 
studies that argued that both over and under investment affects the firm cost of capital (Chen, 
Chen, Lobo & Wang, 2010). 
The results also reported that Book to market value of equity and a cost of equity has a positive 
and significant relationship and the value of coefficient of BM is 0.180 and a P-Value is 0.0615. 
A negative and insignificant relationship is found among Leverage, Size and Cash flow from 
operations on cost of equity.  Although growth has shown a positive impact on cost of equity but 
the P-value (0.8481) shows that it has insignificant impact. Tangibility and return on assets 
shows the negative significant impact on cost of equity as their value of coefficient is -1.824 and 
-0.031 having the P-Value of 0.0106 and 0.000 respectively. The value of intercept is 0.752 
while the value of adjusted R-square is 0.9090 and the value of J-statistics is 7.88E-19.In terms 
of control variables, the results of study are also consistent as reported previously (Chen, Chen, 
& Wei, 2009). A positive but insignificant relation is found between cash flow from operation 
and cost of equity. Similarly Tangibility, book to market value of equity and leverage is found to 
be significantly positively associated with the cost of equity and return on asset has negative and 
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significant impact on the cost of equity. While size and growth reports a negative insignificant 
impact on cost of equity. 
 
Table 3: Regression Results 
Variables 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Coff. t-value Coff. t-value Coffe. t-value 
ABIE 0.379** 2.794 
    OVER 
  
0.901*** 7.289 
  UNDER 
    
-0.123 -0.132 
SH -0.148* -1.77 
    ABIE*SH -0.951** -2.66 
    
CFO 4.77E-08 0.325 -3.90E+08 -1.284 -2.80E-08 -0.096 
TANG 0.410** 2.387 0.248*** 4.154 -1.824** -2.587 
ROA -0.010*** -4.01 -0.008*** -9.099 -0.031*** -6.31 
TA -0.018 -0.785 -0.019*** -3.381 -0.058 -1.055 
BM 0.120** 2.284 0.307*** 7.186 0.180* 1.884 
LEV 0.252** 2.474 0.301*** 5.175 -0.756 -1.531 
GROWTH -0.007 -1.132 0.039 0.967 0.018 0.191 
C 0.561 1.572 0.512*** 4.765 3.148*** 4.627 
        Adj. R
2
 0.247 
 
0.869 
 
0.538 
 J-statistic 32.98 
 
197 
 
0 
 Prob(J stat) 0   0   0   
*** represents significance level at 1%, ** represents significance level at 5%, * represents 
significance level at 10%. 
 
5. Conclusion 
The purpose of this study is to identify and explain the relationship between investment 
efficiency and cost of equity. Using a sample of 235 Pakistani listed non financial firm’s period 
from 2005 to 2015, the impact of investment efficiency on cost of equity was investigated. The 
results of this study showed that there is negative significant association between investment 
efficiency and cost of equity.  These results suggest that investors now a day’s value investment 
efficiency and prefer to invest in firms practicing high corporate governance standards as they 
consider corporate governance an important financial indicator.   
This study also contributes to the literature by providing evidence that how investment efficiency 
effect the cost of equity for the two different types of firms operating under the different 
framework i.e. shariah compliance firms and non shariah compliance firms.  Past studies 
documented that if a firm makes inefficient investment decisions its cost of equity increases as 
the investor demand high rate of return due to the high risk associated with the investment.  A 
similar relation for Shariah and non Shariah Compliance firms was found but the increase in 
Cost of equity for Shariah firms is slightly less than for Non shariah firms this is due to the risk 
associated with both the types of firms and investor’s demand for high return against high risk 
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that is why it is observed that a slight more increase for the cost of equity in non shariah 
compliance firms exists.  
These results also indicate that the issue of over and under investment both negatively effects the 
cost for equity for the firms as it destroys the value of firm while this study also documents that 
the impact of underinvestment is insignificant. These findings have significant impact on firm’s 
management, investors, and creditors and for researchers as well. This study provides evidence 
that all the stakeholders in the market need to realize the impact of investment efficiency and the 
price they have to pay in the presence of investment inefficiency. This study also holds a value 
for the private firms who are planning to go public because this study identified the cost of 
inefficient investment the firm has to pay to its investor’s and also the benefits associated with 
making the efficient investment decisions. The findings of this research are also beneficial for 
the society as they document that how optimal investment decisions would help in efficient 
utilization of scanty resources. 
This study also has some limitations.  First limitation of is that the proxies used in this study for 
investment efficiency and cost of equity is subjected to measurement errors and each 
measurement has some certain advantages and disadvantages. Secondly, there was limited 
sample size which may affect the generalization of the study. Finally, this study is restricted to 
Pakistani firms only, so the results of this study cannot be generalized to other economies 
because of  the change in institutional environment, higher level of investor’s and creditor’s 
protection may provide altogether different results. 
The limitations of this study also provide an opportunity for future research. Only one proxy to 
measure cost of equity and investment efficiency was used, other measures can also be used for 
cost of capital and more control variables for finding residual of investment equation can 
increase the robustness of study (Cheng, Collins & Huang, 2006). Although number of 
controlled variables in the study have been used but maybe there are some other variables that 
can affect the cost of equity for the firms and that can be considered for future research. Finally, 
the impact of investment efficiency on cost of equity can be studied in other economies which 
have different institutional environment and legal settings.        
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